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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the (non-Bayesian and Bayesian ) two-envelope problems in
terms of quantum language (or, measurement theory), which was recently proposed as a linguistic
turn of quantum mechanics (with the Copenhagen interpretation). The two envelopes paradox is
only a kind of high school student’s probability puzzle, and it may be exaggerated to say that this
is an unsolved problem. However, since we are convinced that quantum language is just statistics of
the future, we believe that there is no clear answer without the description by quantum language. In
this sense, the readers are to find that quantum language provides the final answer (i.e., the easiest
and deepest understanding ) to the two envelope-problems in both non-Bayesian and Bayesian
statistics. Also, we add the discussion about St. Petersburg two-envelope paradox.
1 Introduction
1.1 Two-envelope paradox
In what follows, we firstly introduce the two-envelope problem (cf. [16,18]), which is well known
as a kind of high school students’ mathematical puzzle.
Problem 1 [The two envelope problem]. The host presents you with a choice between two envelopes
(i.e., Envelope A and Envelope B). You know one envelope contains twice as much money as the
other, but you do not know which contains more. You choose randomly (by a fair coin toss) one
envelope, for example, call it Envelope A. Suppose that you find α dollars inside your envelope A.
Now the host says ”You are offered the options of keeping your A or switching to my B”. What
should you do?
[(P1):Why is it paradoxical?]. You reason that, with probability 1/2, the other envelope B has
either α/2 or 2α dollars. Thus the expected value (denoted Eother(α) at this moment) of the other
envelope is
Eother(α) = (1/2)(α/2) + (1/2)(2α) = 1.25α (1)
This is greater than the α in your current envelope A. Therefore, you should switch to B. But
this seems clearly wrong, as your information about A and B is symmetrical. This is the famous
two-envelope paradox (i.e., ”The Other Person’s Envelope is Always Greener” ).
Further consider the following problem, which is quite easy.
Problem 1′ [The trivial two envelope problem]. The host presents you with a choice between two
envelopes (i.e., Envelope A and Envelope B). You know Envelope A [resp. Envelope B] includes 10
dollars [resp. 20 dollars]. Define
x =
{
20, ( if x = 10),
10, ( if x = 20)
2You choose randomly (by a fair coin toss) one envelope, And you get x1 dollars (i.e., if the envelope
is A [resp B], x1 is equall to 10 dollars [resp. 20 dollars]). And the host gets x1 dollars. Next,
by a similar way, you choose randomly (by a fair coin toss) one envelope, And you get x2 dollars,
Repeating the trial, you get
x1, x2, x3, · · ·
Then, you can assure, by the law of large numbers (cf. [5, 10,15]), that
lim
N→∞
x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xN
N
= lim
N→∞
x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xN
N
=
10 + 20
2
Is it true? Of course, it is true and not paradoxical.
We consider that it is well known that the above two problems are essentially the same, in spite
that the two are superficially different. Thus, the purpose of this paper is not to show the equality
of the two problems, but to show that
• the equivalence of two problems (i.e., Problem 1 (the two-envelope paradox) and Problem 1′
(the trivial two-envelope paradox) ) is automatically clarified, if Problems 1 is described in
terms of quantum language.
This will be done in Section 3 (non-Bayesian two envelope paradox). Also, we add Section 4
(Bayesian two envelope paradox) and Section 5 (non-Bayesian St. Petersburg two envelope para-
dox). In the following section 2, according to refs. [3]- [14]. we review quantum language.
2 Measurement theory (= Quantum language)
2.1 The motivation of quantum language
In [17], N.D. Mermin introduced Feynman’s two words about quantum mechanics as follows (cf.
The Character of Physical Law (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965)).
(A1) There was a time when the newspapers said that only twelve men understood the theory of
relativity. I do not believe there ever was such a time. There might have been a time when
only one man did, because he was the only guy who caught on, before he wrote his paper.
But after people read the paper a lot of people understood the theory of relativity in some
way or other, certainly more than twelve. On the other hand, I think I can safely say that
nobody understands quantum mechanics.
(A2) We have always had a great deal of difficulty understanding the world view that quantum
mechanics represents. · · · · · · I cannot define the real problem, therefore I suspect there’s no
real problem, but I’m not sure there’s no real problem.
For this significant Feynman’s words, we assert that
(A3) If we start from the declaration ”there’s no real problem”, it is a matter of course that nobody
understands quantum mechanics, but we can necessarily discover ”quantum language”, which
is located such as in Figure 1 (world views) below.
This is all my opinion concerning quantum language.
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2.2 The classifications of measurement theory
In this section, we introduce measurement theory (or in short, MT). This theory is a kind of
language, and thus, it is also called quantum language (or in short, QL).
Measurement theory (cf. refs. [3]- [14]) is, by an analogy of quantum mechanics (or, as a
linguistic turn of quantum mechanics ), constructed as the scientific theory formulated in a certain
C∗-algebra A (i.e., a norm closed subalgebra in the operator algebra B(H) composed of all bounded
linear operators on a Hilbert space H, cf. [19, 20] ).
When A = Bc(H), the C
∗-algebra composed of all compact operators on a Hilbert space H, the
MT is called quantum measurement theory (or, quantum system theory), which can be regarded
as the linguistic aspect of quantum mechanics. Also, when A is commutative
(
that is, when A
is characterized by C0(Ω), the C
∗-algebra composed of all continuous complex-valued functions
vanishing at infinity on a locally compact Hausdorff space Ω (cf. [20])
)
, the MT is called classical
measurement theory. Thus, we have the following classification:
(B1) MT


quantum MT (when non-commutative A = Bc(H) )
classical MT (when commutative A = C0(Ω) )
In this paper, we devote ourselves to CMT(= classical MT), which is classified as follows.
(B2) CMT


(B21): PCMT (= pure classical measurement theory) in §2.3
(B22): SCMT (= statistical classical measurement theory) in §2.4
42.3 The preparation of CMT
For the general theory of measurement theory, see refs. [3]- [14]. In order to read this paper, it
suffices to know the following.
Let Ω be a locally compact space. Define the continuous functions space C0(Ω) such that
C0(Ω) = {f | f is a complex valued continuous function on Ω such that limω→∞ f(ω) = 0 }
which is a Banach space (or precisely, commutative C∗-algebra ) with the norm ‖f‖ = maxω∈Ω |f(ω)|.
LetM(Ω) be the dual Banach space of C0(Ω), i.e.,M(Ω) = C0(Ω)
∗. Riese theorem (cf. ref. [21])
says that M(Ω) is the space of all finite complex-valued measures on Ω. Thus, we denote that
C0(Ω)∗
〈
ρ, f
〉
C0(Ω) =
∫
Ω
f(ω)ρ(dω) (∀f ∈ C0(Ω), ∀ρ ∈ M(Ω) = C0(Ω)
∗)
The Mm(Ω) (i.e., the space of all probability measures on Ω ) is called a mixed state class. An
element ρ(∈ Mm(Ω)) is called a mixed state.
For each ω ∈ Ω, define the point measure δω(∈ M
m(Ω)) such that
C0(Ω)∗
〈
δω, f
〉
C0(Ω) = f(ω) (∀f ∈ C0(Ω))
The Mp(Ω) (i.e., the space of all point measures on Ω ) is called a pure state class. An element
ρ(∈ Mp(Ω)) is called a pure state (or in short, state). Under the identification: Mp(Ω) ∋ δω ←→
ω ∈ Ω, the ω(∈ Ω) is also called a state (or precisely, pure state).
Let ν be a fixed (σ-finite) measure on Ω such that
ν(K) <∞, 0 < ν(D) (∀ compact set K,∀ open set D(∈ BΩ : the Borel field in Ω))
Define the Banach space Lp(Ω, ν) (1 ≤ p ≤ ∞) such that
f ∈ Lp(Ω)⇔ f is a complex-valued measurable function on Ω such that ‖f‖Lp(Ω) <∞
where ‖f‖Lp(Ω) =
[ ∫
Ω |f(ω|
pν(dω)
]1/p
(1 ≤ p < ∞), = inf{a ≥ 0 : ν({ω : |f(ω)| > a}) = 0}
(p =∞).
Motivated by a nice idea in ref. [2], an observable O ≡(X,F , F ) in the L∞(Ω, ν) is defined as
follows:
(C1) [σ-field] X is a set, F(⊆ 2X , the power set of X) is a σ-field of X, that is, “Ξ1,Ξ2,Ξ3, · · · ∈
F ⇒ ∪∞k=1Ξk ∈ F”, “X ∈ F” and “Ξ ∈ F ⇒ X \ Ξ ∈ F”.
(C2) [Countably additivity] F is a mapping from F to L∞(Ω, ν) satisfying: (a): for every Ξ ∈ F ,
F (Ξ) is a non-negative element in L∞(Ω, ν) such that 0 ≤ F (Ξ) ≤ I, (b): F (∅) = 0 and
F (X) = I, where 0 and I is the 0-element and the identity in L∞(Ω, ν) respectively. (c): for
any countable decomposition {Ξ1,Ξ2, . . .} of Ξ ∈ F (i.e., Ξk,Ξ ∈ F such that
⋃∞
k=1 Ξk = Ξ,
Ξi ∩ Ξj = ∅(i 6= j)), it holds that
lim
K→∞ L
1(Ω)
〈ρ, F (
K⋃
k=1
Ξk)〉L∞(Ω,ν) =L1(Ω)〈ρ, F (Ξ)〉L∞(Ω,ν)
(
≡
∫
Ω
ρ(ω) · [F (Ξ)](ω)ν(dω)
)
(2)
(
∀ρ ∈ L1(Ω, ν)
)
i.e., limK→∞ F (
⋃K
k=1 Ξk) = F (Ξ) in the sense of weak
∗ convergence in L∞(Ω, ν).
5Let {fn}
∞
n=1 be a sequence in L
1(Ω, ν). And let ρ0 ∈ M
m(Ω). Here, ”w∗− limn→∞ fn = ρ0” means
that
lim
n→∞
∫
Ω
fn(ω) · φ(ω)ν(dω) =
∫
φ(ω)ρ0(dω) (∀φ ∈ C0(Ω))
And, we say that ”F (∈ L∞(Ω, ν)) is essentially continuous at ρ0(∈ M
m(Ω))”, if there uniquely
exists a complex number γ such that
”w∗ − lim
n→∞
fn = ρ0” =⇒ ” lim
n→∞
∫
Ω
F (ω) · fn(ω)ν(dω) = γ”
And we denote that ρ0(F ) ( = C0(Ω)∗〈ρ0, F 〉L∞(Ω,ν)) = γ.
Remark 1. Without loss of generality, we can assume that Ω is compact, and ν(Ω) = 1.
2.4 Pure Classical Measurement Theory
With any classical system S, a fundamental structure [C0(Ω) ⊆ L
∞(Ω, ν)] can be associated
in which the pure measurement theory (B21) of that system can be formulated. A pure state of
the system S is represented by an element δω(∈ M
p(Ω)=”pure state class”(cf. ref. [6])) and an
observable is represented by an observable O =(X,F , F ) in L∞(Ω, ν). Also, the measurement of
the observable O for the system S with the pure state δω is denoted by ML∞(Ω,ν)(O, S[δω ])
(
or more
precisely, ML∞(Ω,ν)(O =(X,F , F ), S[δω ])
)
. An observer can obtain a measured value x (∈ X) by
the measurement ML∞(Ω,ν)(O, S[δω ]).
The AxiomPCMT 1 presented below is a kind of mathematical generalization of Born’s proba-
bilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics.
AxiomPCMT 1 [Pure Measurement]. The probability that a measured value x (∈ X) obtained by
the measurement ML∞(Ω,ν)(O ≡(X,F , F ), S[δω0 ]) belongs to a set Ξ(∈ F) is given by δω0(F (Ξ))(
= C0(Ω)∗〈δω0 , F (Ξ)〉L∞(Ω,ν)
)
, if F (Ξ) is essentially continuous at δω0 .
Let [C0(Ω, ν) ⊆ L
∞(Ω, ν)] be a fundamental structure. We shall introduce the following nota-
tion: It is usual to consider that we do not know the pure state δω (∈ M
p(Ω)) when we take a
measurementML∞(Ω,ν)(O, S[δω ]). That is because we usually take a measurementML∞(Ω,ν)(O, S[δω ])
in order to know the state δω. Thus,
(D1) when we want to emphasize that we do not know the state δω, ML∞(Ω,ν)(O, S[δω ]) is denoted
by ML∞(Ω,ν)(O, S[∗])
(D2) also, when we know the distribution ρ0 (∈ M
m(Ω)) of the unknown state δω, the ML∞(Ω,ν)(O,
S[δω ]) is denoted by ML∞(Ω,ν)(O, S[∗](ρ0)). The ρ0 is called a mixed state.
We have the following fundamental theorem in measurement theory:
Theorem 1 [Fisher’s maximum likelihood method (cf. [4]- [11])]. Assume that a measured value
x(∈ X) is obtained by a measurement ML∞(Ω,ν)(O := (X,F , F ), S[∗]). Put
f(x, ω) = inf
ω1∈Ω
[
lim
Ξ→{x},Ξ∋x,[F (Ξ)](ω1)6=0
[F (Ξ)](ω)
[F (Ξ)](ω1)
]
(∀ω ∈ Ω) (3)
6Then, there is a reason to infer that the unknown state [∗] is equal to δω0 (∈ Ω) such that
f(x, ω0) = 1
Also, if f(x, ω1) = 0, then there is no possibility that [∗] = δω1 .
Definition 1 [Parallel measurement]. Consider two measurements: ML∞(Ω1,ν1)(O1 := (X1,F1, F1),
S[δω1 ]) and ML∞(Ω2,ν2)(O2 := (X2,F2, F2), S[δω2 ]). Let (Ω1 × Ω2, ν1 ⊗ ν2) be the product measure
space of (Ω1, ν1) and (Ω2, ν2). And consider the parallel measurementML∞(Ω1×Ω2,ν1⊗ν2) (O1⊗O2 :=
(X1 ×X2,F1 ⊠F2, F1 ⊗F2), S[δ(ω1,ω2)]
), which is denoted by
⊗2
n=1ML∞(Ωn,νn)(On := (X1,Fn, Fn),
S[δωn ]). Here, F1 ⊠ F2 is the product field of F1 and F2. And, F1 ⊗ F2 is defined by
[(F1 ⊗ F2)(Ξ1 × Ξ2)](ω1, ω2) = [F1(Ξ1)](ω1) · [F2(Ξ2)](ω2)
(∀(ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω1 × Ω2, ∀Ξ1 ∈ F1, ∀Ξ2 ∈ F2 ). Here, the linguistic interpretation of quantum
mechanics (cf. [6, 7] ) asserts the identification: ”(D3)+(D4)” ⇔ ”(D5)”:
(D3) a measured value x1(∈ X1) is obtained by a measurementML∞(Ω1,ν1)(O1 := (X1,F1, F1), S[δω1 ])
(D4) a measured value x2(∈ X2) is obtained by a measurementML∞(Ω2,ν1)(O2 := (X2,F2, F2), S[δω2 ])
(D5) a measured value (x1, x2)(∈ X1 ×X2) is obtained by a measurement ML∞(Ω1×Ω2ν1⊗ν2)(O1 ⊗
O2 := (X1 ×X2,F1 ⊠ F2, F1 ⊗ F2), S[δ(ω1,ω2)]
)
This definition is generalized as follows. For each n ∈ N = {1, 2, · · · }, consider a measurement:
ML∞(Ωn,νn)(On := (Xn,Fn, Fn), S[δωn ]). Let (×n∈NΩn,
⊗
n∈N νn) be the infinite product probabil-
ity measure space (cf. Remark 1 and [15]). Let (×n∈NXn,⊠n∈NFn) be the infinite product mea-
surable space. Then, we have the parallel observable
⊗
n∈NOn = (×n∈NXn,⊠n∈NFn,
⊗
n∈N Fn)
in L∞(×n∈NΩn,
⊗
n∈N νn)) such that
[(
⊗
n∈N
Fn)(×
n∈N
Ξn)](ω1, ω2, · · · ) = ×
n∈N
[Fn(Ξn)](ωn) (∀Ξn ∈ Fn,∀(ω1, ω2, · · · ) ∈ ×
n∈N
Ωn)
where a set {n ∈ N |; Ξn 6= Xn} is finite.
Thus, we have the infinite parallel measurement:
⊗∞
n=1ML∞(Ωn,νn)(On := (X1,Fn, Fn), S[δωn ]),
i.e.,
M
L∞(×n∈NΩn,
⊗
n∈Nνn)
(
⊗
n∈N
On = (×n∈NXn,⊠n∈NFn,⊗n∈NFn), S[δ(ω1,ω2,··· )]) (4)
2.5 Statistical Classical Measurement Theory
The AxiomSCMT 1 presented below is also a kind of mathematical generalization of Born’s
probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics.
AxiomSCMT 1 [Statistical measurement]. Recall the (D2). The probability that a measured value
x (∈ X) obtained by the measurement ML∞(Ω,ν)(O ≡(X,F , F ), S[∗](ρ0)) belongs to a set Ξ(∈ F) is
given by ρ0(F (Ξ)) ( = C0(Ω)∗〈ρ0, F (Ξ)〉L∞(Ω,ν) ) if F (Ξ) is essentially continuous at ρ0.
Theorem 2 [Bayes’ method (cf. [3]- [11])]. Assume that a measured value x(∈ X) is obtained by
a measurement ML∞(Ω,ν)(O := (X,F , F ), S[∗](ρ0)). Thus, we can assert that:
7(E) When we know a measured value x(∈ X) obtained by a statistical measurementML∞(Ω,ν)(O ≡
(X,F , F ), S[∗](ρ0)), there is a reason to infer that the post-state (i.e., the mixed state after
the measurement ) is equal to ρxpost (∈ M
m(Ω, ν)), where
ρxpost = lim
Ξ→{x}
[F (Ξ)](ω) ρ0∫
Ω[F (Ξ)](ω) ρ0(dω)
(5)
Remark 2 [Bayesian statistics]. When Bayes’ theorem is used in SCMT, SCMT is called Bayesian
statistics. In Bayesian statistics, the mixed state ρ0 may be called a ”pretest state” (cf. refs. [4]– [11]
).
Remark 3 [Overview; quantum language (cf. [3]- [14]) ]. Although, in order to read this paper,
it suffices to understand Axiom 1 (measurement: AxiomPCMT 1 and AxiomSCMT 1 ), we want to
mention the overview of quantum language as follows. Quantum language (=QL) is a kind of
metaphysics (i.e., language) that has the following structure:
QL =
(Axiom 1)
measurement +
(Axiom 2)
causality +
(the manual how to use Axioms 1 and 2)
Linguistic interpretation
And quantum language says that
(F1) Follow examples of the wordings in Axioms 1 and 2, and describe every phenomenon!
Applying a trial-and-error method repeatedly, you may make progress without the manual (i.e.,
the linguistic interpretation). In fact, the author has mastered the linguistic interpretation now at
last by the trial and error for about twenty years. In this sense, the manual (i.e., the linguistic
interpretation) is not absolutely indispensable for quantum language. That is, we consider that
the term ”interpretation” should not exist in physics but in metaphysics. However, it is earlier for
progress to know the manual. For example, the following two:
(F2) consider the dualism (i.e., observer and object)
(F3) only one measurement is permitted
are leading indicators. Although we believe that the linguistic interpretation should be determined
uniquely and naturally, this is not guaranteed. However, if it is not determined uniquely, it suffices
to add something to axioms. This is the fate of metaphysics. Also, note that
(F4) the competitor of quantum language (i.e., the linguistic interpretation of quantum mechanics)
is statistics and is not physics (i.e., the several interpretations of quantum mechanics).
Of course, we believe that quantum language is forever.
83 Non-Bayesian approach to the two envelopes problem
3.1 The simple answer in which it is hard to notice the mistake (1)
Consider the classical fundamental structure such that
[C0(Ω) ⊆ L
∞(Ω, ν)]
Put X = R+ = {x | x is a non-negative real number}. Let V1 : Ω → R+ and V2 : Ω → R+ be
continuous maps. You may think that V2(ω) = 2V1(ω) (∀ω ∈ Ω).
For each k = 1, 2, define the observable Ok = (X(= R+),F(= BR+ : the Borel field), Fk) in
L∞(Ω, ν) such that
[Fk(Ξ)](ω) =
{
1 ( if Vk(ω) ∈ Ξ)
0 ( if Vk(ω) /∈ Ξ)
(∀ω ∈ Ω,∀Ξ ∈ F = B
R+
i.e., the Bore field in X(= R+) )
Here we identify Vk with Ok. Further, define the observable O = (X,F , F ) in L
∞(Ω, ν) such that
F (Ξ) =
1
2
(
F1(Ξ) + F2(Ξ)
)
(∀Ξ ∈ F) (6)
that is,
[F (Ξ)](ω) =


1 ( if V1(ω) ∈ Ξ, V2(ω) ∈ Ξ)
1/2 ( if V1(ω) ∈ Ξ, V2(ω) /∈ Ξ)
1/2 ( if V1(ω) /∈ Ξ, V2(ω) ∈ Ξ)
0 ( if V1(ω) /∈ Ξ, V2(ω) /∈ Ξ)
(∀ω ∈ Ω,∀Ξ ∈ F = B
R+
i.e., the Bore field in X(= R+) )
In what follws, we shall present the three answers to Problem 1 such that
Simple answer
(in §3.1.1)
−−−−−−−−−−→
(more strict)
Usual answer
(in §3.1.2)
−−−−−−−−−−→
(more strict)
Strict answer
(in §3.1.3)
which are essentially equivalent, and thus, these are true.
3.1.1 The simplest answer to Problem 1
Fix any ω0(∈ Ω), which is assumed to be unknown. Consider the measurement ML∞(Ω,ν)(O =
(X,F , F ), S[δω0 ]). Then, Axiom
PCMT 1 says that
(G1) the probability that a measured value
{
V1(ω0)
V2(ω0)
}
obtained by the measurementML∞(Ω,ν)(O =
(X,F , F ), S[δω0 ]) is given by
{
1/2
1/2
}
.
9Then, by the switching to
{
V2(ω0)
V1(ω0)
}
, you gain
{
V2(ω0)− V1(ω0)
V1(ω0)− V2(ω0)
}
dollars. This means that
the expectation of the switching gain is equal to
(V2(ω0)− V1(ω0))/2 + (V1(ω0)− V2(ω0))/2 = 0, (which is independent of ω0). (7)
This implies that the swapping is even, i.e., no advantage and no disadvantage.
Since ω0(∈ Ω) is assumed to be unknown, the measurement ML∞(Ω,ν)(O = (X,F , F ), S[δω0 ]) is
also denoted by ML∞(Ω,ν)(O = (X,F , F ), S[∗]). Thus, when you obtain a measured value α (∈ X)
by ML∞(Ω,ν)(O = (X,F , F ), S[∗]) (and you do not have a way for getting to know whether the
money included in the other envelope is more or less than α dollars), you should conclude that the
swapping is even. That is, we can not believe in the proverb: ”The Other Person’s Envelope is
Always Greener”.
3.1.2 The usual answer to Problem 1
Define the quasi-product observable O
q
× O = (X ×X,F ⊠ F , F
q
× F ) in L∞(Ω, ν) such that
[(F
q
×F )(Ξ × Γ)](ω) =


1 ( if V1(ω) ∈ Ξ, V2(ω) ∈ Ξ, V1(ω) ∈ Γ, V2(ω) ∈ Γ)
1/2 ( if V1(ω) ∈ Ξ, V2(ω) /∈ Ξ, V1(ω) /∈ Γ, V2(ω) ∈ Γ)
1/2 ( if V1(ω) /∈ Ξ, V2(ω) ∈ Ξ, V1(ω) ∈ Γ, V2(ω) /∈ Γ)
0 ( if V1(ω) /∈ Ξ, V2(ω) /∈ Ξ, V1(ω) /∈ Γ, V2(ω) /∈ Γ)
(∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀Ξ,∀Γ ∈ F = B
R+
i.e., the Bore field in X(= R+) )
Fix any ω0(∈ Ω), which is assumed to be unknown. Consider the measurement ML∞(Ω,ν)( O
q
× O
= (X ×X,F ⊠ F , F
q
× F ), S[δω0 ]). Then, Axiom
PCMT 1 says that
(G2) the probability that a measured value
{
(V1(ω0), V2(ω0))
(V2(ω0), V1(ω0))
}
obtained by the measurement
ML∞(Ω,ν)( O
q
× O = (X ×X,F ⊠ F , F
q
× F ), S[δω0 ]) is given by
{
1/2
1/2
}
.
Here,
(G3) ”a measured value
{
(V1(ω0), V2(ω0))
(V2(ω0), V1(ω0))
}
is obtained” means
”you and the host respectively get
{
V1(ω0)
V2(ω0)
}
dollars and
{
V2(ω0)
V1(ω0)
}
dollars”
Therefore,
(G4) your expectation [V1(ω0)+V2(ω0)2 ] and the host’s expectation [
V2(ω0)+V1(ω0)
2 ] are equal.
This implies that the swapping is even in the sense of (G4), i.e., no advantage and no disadvantage.
That is, we can not believe in the proverb: ”The Other Person’s Envelope is Always Greener”.
3.1.3 The strict answer ((F3): only one measurement is prmitted)
Fix any ω0(∈ Ω), which is assumed to be unknown. Consider the measurement ML∞(Ω,ν)(
O
q
× O = (X ×X,F ⊠ F , F
q
× F ), S[δω0 ]). And further, consider the infinite parallel measurement
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⊗
n∈NML∞(Ω,ν)( O
q
×O = (X×X,F ⊠F , F
q
×F ), S[δω0 ]), whichi is, by (4), characterized as follows.
ML∞(ΩN,⊗n∈Nν)
(⊗
n∈N
(O
q
× O) =
(
(X ×X)N,⊠n∈N(F ⊠ F),⊗n∈N(F
q
× F )
)
, S[δ(ω0)n∈N ]
)
Then, AxiomPCMT 1 says that
(G5) the probability P (Ξ̂) that a measured value obtained by the infinite parallel measurement⊗
n∈NML∞(Ω,ν)( O
q
×O = (X ×X,F ⊠F , F
q
×F ), S[δω0 ]) belongs to Ξ̂(∈ (F ⊠F)
⊠N) is given
by
P (Ξ̂) =
[(⊗
n∈N
(F
q
× F )
)
(Ξ̂)
]
(ω0, ω0, · · · )
Here, put
Ξ̂ =
{
(xn, yn)n∈N ∈ (X ×X)
N | lim
1
N
N∑
n=1
xn = lim
1
N
N∑
n=1
yn =
V1(ω0) + V2(ω0)
2
}
Then we see, by (G2) and the law of large numbers (cf. [5, 10,15]), that
P (Ξ̂) =
[(⊗
n∈N
(F
q
× F )
)
(Ξ̂)
]
(ω0, ω0, · · · ) = 1
lim
1
N
N∑
n=1
xn = lim
1
N
N∑
n=1
yn =
V1(ω0) + V2(ω0)
2
(∀(xn, yn)n∈N ∈ Ξ̂)
This implies that the swapping is even, in the above sense, i.e., no advantage and no disadvantage.
That is, we can not believe in the proverb: ”The Other Person’s Envelope is Always Greener”.
It should be noted that the above explanation is common to both Probalem 1 and Problem 1′.
That is, we assert that
Problem 1
(in §1.1)
= Simple answer
(in §3.1.1)
= Usual answer
(in §3.1.2)
= Strict answer
(in §3.1.3)
= Problem 1′
(in §1.1)
Therefore, quantum language says that
(G6) Problem 1 is essentially the same as Problem 1′.
Also, we believe that this (G6) is just the excellent statisticians’ assertion.
Remark 4. If it holds that V1(ω0) = V2(ω0), it is clear that the swapping is even. Therefore,
without loss of generality, we can assume that V1(ω0) 6= V2(ω0). Also, it should be noted that the
above argument is applicable to the simplest case that Ω = {ω0}, i.e., the one-point space.
3.2 The answer in which it is easy to notice the mistake (1)
The answer in Section 3.1 is best, but it does not explain why we make a mistake (1). Thus we
add the following.
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3.2.1 The simplest answer to Problem 1
Put Ω = {(ω, 2ω, ) | ω ∈ R+}. Here note that the Ω can be identified with R+, i.e.,
Ω ∋ (ω, 2ω)←→ ω ∈ R+ (8)
and assume that it has the Lebesgue measure ν(dω), which is simply denoted by dω from here.
Define the observable O = (X(= R+),F(= BR+ : the Borel field), F ) in L
∞(Ω, dω) such that
[F (Ξ)](ω, 2ω)
(
≡ [F (Ξ)](ω)
)
=


1 ( if ω ∈ Ξ, 2ω ∈ Ξ)
1/2 ( if ω ∈ Ξ, 2ω /∈ Ξ)
1/2 ( if ω /∈ Ξ, 2ω ∈ Ξ)
0 ( if ω /∈ Ξ, 2ω /∈ Ξ)
(∀(ω, 2ω) ∈ Ω,∀Ξ ∈ F)
(9)
Thus, for any unknown state (ω0, 2ω0)(∈ Ω), we have the measurement ML∞(Ω,dω)(O = (X,F , F ),
S[δ(ω0,2ω0)]
). And, we see, by AxiomPCMT 1, that
(H1) the probability that a measured value x(∈ X(= R+)) obtained by ML∞(Ω,dω)(O = (X,F , F ),
S[δ(ω0,2ω0)]
) is equal to
{
ω0
2ω0
}
is given by
{
1/2
1/2
}
.
Here, assume that
{
x = ω0
x = 2ω0
}
. Then, by the switching to
{
2ω0
ω0
}
, you gain
{
2ω0 − ω0
ω0 − 2ω0
}
.
This implies that the expectation of the switching gain is equal to
(2ω0 − ω0)/2 + (ω0 − 2ω0)/2 = 0
which implies that the swapping is even, i.e., no advantage and no disadvantage.
Since (ω0, 2ω0)(∈ Ω) is assumed to be unknown, the measurement ML∞(Ω,dω)(O = (X,F , F ),
S[δ(ω0,2ω0)]
) is also denoted by ML∞(Ω,dω)(O = (X,F , F ), S[∗]). Thus, when you obtain a measured
value α (∈ X) by ML∞(Ω,dω)(O = (X,F , F ), S[∗]), you should conclude that the swapping is even.
3.2.2 Why do we make a mistake (1)?
✻
✲
α
(α2 , α) (α, 2α)
X(= R+)
Ω(≈ R+)
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Now we can explain why we make a mistake (1). Let ML∞(Ω,dω)(O = (X,F , F ), S[∗]) be
the measurement considered in Section 3.2.1. Assume that a measured value α is obtained by
ML∞(Ω,dω)(O = (X,F , F ), S[∗]). Here, note that, the likelihood function (3) is calculated as follows:
f(α, ω) ≡ inf
ω1∈Ω
[
lim
Ξ→{α},Ξ∋α,[F (Ξ)](ω1)6=0
[F (Ξ)](ω)
[F (Ξ)](ω1)
]
=
{
1 (ω = (α/2, α) or (α, 2α))
0 ( elsewhere )
Therefore, we can infer, by Theorem 1 (Fisher’s maximum likelihood method), that
(H2) the unknown state [∗] is equal to (α/2, α) or (α, 2α),(
if [∗] = (α/2, α) [resp. [∗] = (α, 2α) ], the switching gain is (α/2 − α) [resp. (2α − α)]
)
.
However, it is not guaranteed that
(H3)


”the probability that [∗] = (α/2, α)”=1/2,
”the probability that [∗] = (α, 2α)”=1/2,
”the probability that [∗] is elsewhere”=0
That is, the phrase: ”with probability 1/2” in [(P1): Why is it paradoxical?] is wrong, and therefore,
the expectation of the switching gain ”Eother(α) − α = (1/2)(α/2) + (1/2)(2α) − α = α/4 > 0”
is wrong. That is, it is impossible to calculate the expected value Eother(α). In other words, the
expected value Eother(α) in the formula (1) is meaningless.
4 Bayesian approach to the two envelopes paradox
In the framework of the pure measurement ML∞(Ω,dω)(O = (X,F , F ), S[∗]) (defined in Section
3.2), we can not derive the statement (H3). Thus, next, consider another situation of Problem 1
(Bayesian approach to the two envelopes paradox), i.e., the statistical measurement ML∞(Ω,dω)(O =
(X,F , F ), S[∗](ρ0)). Recalling the identification (8): Ω ∋ (ω, 2ω)←→ ω ∈ R+, assume that
ρ0(D) =
∫
D
h(ω)dω (∀D ∈ BΩ = BR+)
where the probability density function h : Ω(≈ R+) → Ω(= R+) is assumed to be continuous
positive function. That is, the mixed state ρ0(∈ M
m(Ω(= R+))) has the probability density
function h.
AxiomSCMT 1 says that
(I1) The probability P (Ξ) (Ξ ∈ BX = BR+) that a measured value obtained by the statistical
measurement ML∞(Ω,dω)(O = (X,F , F ), S[∗](ρ0)) belongs to Ξ(∈ BX = BR+) is given by
P (Ξ) =
∫
Ω
[F (Ξ)](ω)ρ0(dω) =
∫
Ω
[F (Ξ)](ω)h(ω)dω
=
∫
Ξ
h(x/2)
4
+
h(x)
2
dx (∀Ξ ∈ B
R+
) (10)
Therefore, the expectation is given by∫
R+
xP (dx) =
1
2
∫ ∞
0
x ·
(
h(x/2)/2 + h(x)
)
dx =
3
2
∫
R+
xh(x)dx (11)
Further, Theorem 2 ( Bayes’ theorem ) says that
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(I2) When a measured value α is obtained by the statistical measurementML∞(Ω,dω)(O = (X,F , F ),
S[∗](ρ0)), then the post-state ρ
α
post(∈ M
m(Ω)) is given by
(5) = ραpost =
h(α/2)
2
h(α/2)
2 + h(α)
δ(α
2
,α) +
h(α)
h(α/2)
2 + h(α)
δ(α,2α) (12)
Hence,
(I3) if [∗] =
{
δ(α
2
,α)
δ(α,2α)
}
, then we have to change
{
α −→ α2
α −→ 2α
}
, and thus we get the switching
gain
{
α
2 − α(= −
α
2 )
2α− α(= α)
}
.
Therefore, the expectation of the switching gain is calculated as follows:
∫
R+
(
(−
α
2
)
h(α/2)
2
h(α/2)
2 + h(α)
+ α
h(α)
h(α/2)
2 + h(α)
)
P (dα)
=
∫
R+
(−
α
2
)
h(α/2)
4
+ α ·
h(α)
2
dα = 0 (13)
Therefore, if
∫
ωh(ω)dω <∞, we see, by (11), that the swapping is even, i.e., no advantage and no
disadvantage, in the sense of (13).
5 The St. Petersburg two-envelope paradox in quantum language
5.1 The St. Petersburg two-envelope paradox
In what follows, we introduce the St. Petersburg two-envelope problem (cf. [1]), which is well
known as a kind of high school students’ mathematical puzzle.
Problem 2 [The St. Petersburg two envelope problem]. You are presented with two envelopes, A
and B. You are told that each of them contains an amount determined by the following procedure,
performed separately for each envelope: a coin was flipped until it came up heads, and if it came
up heads on the nth trial, 2n is put into the envelope. This procedure is performed separately for
each envelope. You are given envelope A, and you find 2m dollars in the envelope A. Now you are
offered the options of keeping A or switching to B. What should you do?
[(P2);Why is it paradoxical?]. You reason that, before opening the envelopes A and B, the expected
values E(x) and E(y) in A and B is infinite respectively. For any 2m, if you knew that A contained
x = 2m dollars, then the expected value E(y) in B would still be infinite. Therefore, you should
switch to B. But this seems clearly wrong, as your information about A and B is symmetrical. This
is the famous St. Petersburg two-envelope paradox (i.e., ”The Other Person’s Envelope is Always
Greener” ).
5.2 (P2): The St. Petersburg two-envelope paradox in Statistical CMT ( with-
out Bayes’ method)
Here, let us explain the St. Petersburg two-envelope paradox in Statistical CMT ( without
Bayes’ method).
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Define the state space Ω such that Ω = {ω | ω = 1, 2, · · · } with the counting measure ν, that
is, the set of all natural numbers. And define the observable O = (X,F , F ) such that
X = {k | k = 1, 2, · · · }, F = 2X
[F (Ξ)](ω) =
{
1 ( if ω ∈ Ξ)
0 ( elsewhere )
(∀Ξ ∈ F ,∀ω = 1, 2, · · · )
Define the mixed state ρ0 (i.e., the probability measure on Ω) such that
ρ0({ω}) =
{
1/2m ( if ω = 2m,m = 1, 2, ...)
0 ( elsewhere )
Consider the statistical measurement ML∞(Ω,ν)(O = (X,F , F ), S[∗](ρ0)). Axiom
SCMT 1 says that
(J1) the probability that a measured value x(∈ X) obtained by ML∞(Ω,ν)(O = (X,F , F ), S[∗](ρ0))
is equal to 2k is given by 2−k.
Therefore, the expectation E(x) of a measured value is equal to
E(x) =
∞∑
k=1
2k · 2−k =∞
Now consider the parallel measurement ML∞(Ω×Ω,ν⊗ν)(O⊗O = (X×X,F ⊠F , F ⊗F ), S[(∗,∗)](ρ0⊗
ρ0)), where ρ0 ⊗ ρ0 is the product measure on Ω × Ω. By the similar way of Definition 1, we
consider that this parallel measurement is the same as taking a measurement ML∞(Ω,ν)(O =
(X,F , F ), S[∗](ρ0)) twice. Let (x, y)(∈ X × X) be the measured value obtained by the parallel
measurement ML∞(Ω×Ω,ν⊗ν)(O⊗O = (X ×X,F ⊠F , F ⊗F ), S[δ(ω0,ω0)]
). We of course see that the
expectation E(x, y) = (∞,∞). Problem 2 says that you got a measured value 2m (i.e., 2m dollars
in Envelope A). Namely, x = 2m. However, since E(y) = ∞, in the next measurement, you are
expected to get a measured value y such that E(y) = ∞ > 2m. That is, you are expected to find
y dollars (i.e., E(y) =∞ > 2m) in Envelope B. Thus, you should switch to Envelope B.
Remark 5. (i): Note that, in the above argument, AxiomSCMT 1 is used, and not Bayes’ theorem
(Theorem 2) (cf. the formula (5)).
(ii): Recall the statement ”as your information about A and B is symmetrical” in [(P2): Why is
it paradoxical?]. This statement is not true, since you find 2m dollars in Envelope A, but you do
not open Envelope B yet. Therefore, Problem 2 is not paradoxical. That is, we can believe in the
proverb: ”The Other Person’s Envelope is Always Greener”. However, if you do not open both
envelopes, Envelopes A and B are even.
(iii): The probability P (y > 2m) such that ”y > 2m” is easily calculated as follows.
P (y > 2m) =
1
2m
Concerning the St. Petersburg two-envelope paradox, this ”probability criterion” may be rather
reasonable.
5.3 (P2): The St. Petersburg two-envelope paradox in Pure CMT (≈ non-
Bayesian statistics)
Let us explain the St. Petersburg two-envelope paradox in Pure CMT, which is essentially the
same as the argument in the previous section 5.2.
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Define the state space Ω such that Ω = {ω0}, that is, the set composed of one element, where
nu({ω0}) = 1. And define the observable O = (X,F , F ) such that
X = {2k | k = 1, 2, · · · }, F = 2X
[F ({2k})](ω0) = 2
−k (k = 1, 2, · · · )
Consider the measurement ML∞(Ω,ν)(O = (X,F , F ), S[δω0 ]). Then, Axiom
PCMT 1 says that
(J2) the probability that a measured value x(∈ X) obtained by ML∞(Ω,ν)(O = (X,F , F ), S[δω0 ]) is
equal to 2k is given by 2−k.
Therefore, the expectation E(x) of a measured value x is equal to
E(x) =
∞∑
k=1
2k · 2−k =∞
Now consider the parallel measurement ML∞(Ω×Ω,ν⊗ν)(O⊗O = (X ×X,F ⊠F , F ⊗F ), S[δ(ω0,ω0)]
).
Recalling Definition 1, we consider that this parallel measurement is the same as taking a measure-
ment ML∞(Ω,ν)(O = (X,F , F ), S[δω0 ]) twice. Let (x, y)(∈ X ×X) be the measured value obtained
by the parallel measurementML∞(Ω×Ω,ν⊗ν)(O⊗O = (X×X,F⊠F , F⊗F ), S[δ(ω0,ω0)]
). We of course
see that the expectation E(x, y) = (∞,∞). Problem 2 says that you got a measured value 2m (i.e.,
2m dollars in Envelope A). Namely, x = 2m. However, since E(y) =∞, in the next measurement,
you are expected to get a measured value y such that E(y) = ∞ > 2m. That is, you are expected
to find y dollars (i.e., E(y) =∞ > 2m) in Envelope B. Thus, you should switch to Envelope B.
Remark 6. The above answer may be rather fit for the following problem.
(K) In the envelope A and the envelope B, there are infinite pins {Pk}
∞
k=1 with the length 2
−k.
The pin Pk may be identified with the interval (2
−k, 21−k] (⊆ (0, 1]). Assume that the pin
Pk is 2
k dollars. And further assume that the probability that a pin Pk will be picked from
Envelope A (and Envelope B) is given by 2−k. You are given envelope A, and, from the
envelope A, you pick up a pin Pm, which is 2
m dollars. Now you are offered the options of
keeping A or switching to B. What should you do?
Although this and Problem 2 are similar but somewhat different, we consider that two answers (in
Sections 5.2 and 5.3) are valid.
6 Conclusions
In order to show the great descriptive power of quantum language (i.e., ”quantum language is
future statistics”), we want to assert that
(L1) if a probabilistic problem is described in terms of quantum language, the problem will be
automatically solved.
As one of examples (L1), in this paper we showed that the two envelope problem is automatically
solved in Section 3 (non-Bayesian two envelopes paradox) and Section 4 (Bayesian two envelopes
paradox).
The readers may ask the following question:
(L2) Why is it hard to make a mistake in quantum language method?
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We consider that this is due to the fact:
(L3) Quantum language has visible key-words: ”measurement”, ”observable”, ”state”, ”measured
value”. And these concepts are motivated by quantum mechanics.
On the other hand, statistics has invisible key-words: ”probability space”, ”random variable”,
”parameter”.
This is our answer to the question (L2). Also, it should be noted that the sum (6) of observables
has not appeared once throughout our research [3]- [14], that is, it is rare in the usual situations.
In this sense, the two envelopes problem may be tricky and paradoxical. After all, we conclude
that quantum language provides the final answer (i.e., the easiest and deepest understanding ) to
the two envelope-problem.
Also, we add:
(L4) In Section 5, we see that the St. Petersburg two-envelope paradox has two formulations (i.e.,
Classical SMT and Classical PMT), and also, the St. Petersburg two-envelope paradox is
independent of Bayes’ method, and thus it is not related to Bayesian statistics (cf. Remark
2).
For completeness, our main assertion (G6) is again rewritten as follows.
(L5) quantum language says that, if Problem 1 is a scientific statement, Problem 1 should be
essentially the same as Problem 1′. If the reader wants to assert that these are different, he
has to propose another language (except quantum) by which Problem 1 and Problem 1′ are
described as the different problems. That is because we believe Wittgenstein’s words (i.e.,
the spirit of the philosophy of language):”The limits of my language mean the limits of my
world.”
We hope that our proposal will be discussed and examined from various view-points.
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